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I. INTRODUCTION
If I am injured in the course of medical investigation or treatment,
I may be eligible to receive compensation for some of the adverse
consequences of my injury—at least, if I live in a developed country.
In most such countries, there exists some form of state-administered
compensation scheme for medical injuries. However, even within the
developed world, there is considerable variation in the eligibility criteria
for compensation. Different countries would, for example, respond very
differently to the following pair of cases.
Case 1. Mr. Smith suffers a brain haemorrhage as a result of a
genetic defect in the arteries supplying his brain. He is taken
immediately to hospital where he is rushed to the operating
theatre, unconscious, to have the blood drained from his skull.
During the course of the operation, the surgeon negligently
damages the part of his brain that controls his right leg. Though
Smith subsequently recovers from his haemorrhage, the damage
inﬂicted by the surgeon leaves him with a permanently paralysed leg.
Case 2. Mrs. Jones, like Mr. Smith, suffers a brain haemorrhage as a
result of a genetic defect. Jones too is rushed to the operating theatre,
and, as with Smith, the surgeon damages the part of her brain that
controls her right leg. In Jones’ case, however, the damage is not
due to negligence on the surgeon’s part. It is instead an unusual
side effect of good surgical practice: the surgeon (correctly) believes
that it is necessary to damage this part of the brain in order to stop
the haemorrhage and thus save Jones’ life. The result, however, is
the same. Jones recovers from the haemorrhage, but is left with a
permanently paralysed leg.
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compensation through a court-based tort law system, whereas Jones
would be left to make do with the ordinary social security and public
healthcare arrangements. The difference in treatment arises because
tort systems typically endorse the ‘fault criterion’ according to which
the victim of an injury is awarded compensation, paid by the injurer,
only if she can establish that the injurer in question was at fault for
her injury. Plausibly, Smith could establish this.
1 Jones, however,
surely could not.
In a second group of jurisdictions, including Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, France, New Zealand, Florida and Virginia, the
fault criterion has been eliminated, at least for some kinds of medical
injury. These moves have been taken to their greatest extent in New
Zealand, where a statutory accident compensation system has for over
30 years compensated medical injury on a no-fault basis:
2 the scheme
provides compensation to medical injury victims without regard to
whether their injuries can be attributed to the negligence or other
wrongdoing of a medical professional,
3 and if a claim for compensation
is successful, that compensation is paid from an account maintained
through general taxation.
4 Under the New Zealand scheme, Smith
and Jones might well both receive (equal) compensation, and the negli-
gent surgeon would escape the requirement to pay compensatory
damages. The surgeon could, however, be referred for criminal or
medical disciplinary investigation.
5
1 Negligence is standardly taken to ground an attribution of fault. Besides neg-
ligence, the other major grounds are recklessness and intentional harm. For
discussion, see P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 6th
edn (Butterworths 1999) at 25–28.
2 The New Zealand scheme is administered by the Accident Compensation Cor-
poration under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act
2001. For two excellent analyses of the scheme, see G. W.R. Palmer, ‘New
Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years On’ (1994) 44 Uni-
versity of Toronto Law Journal 223; S. Todd, ‘Privatization of Accident Com-
pensation: Policy and Politics in New Zealand’ (2000) 39 Washburn Law
Journal 404.
3 To be eligible for medical injury compensation under the New Zealand
scheme, a claimant must establish that her injury was a ‘treatment injury’:
that is, an injury due to treatment that was not ‘a necessary part, or ordinary
consequence, of the treatment’. See The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and
Compensation Amendment Act (No. 2) 2005 s. 32, esp. s. 32(1)(c). For discus-
sion, see K. Oliphant, ‘Beyond Misadventure: Compensation for Medical Inju-
ries in New Zealand’ (2007) 15 Med. L. R. 357.
4 Accident Compensation Corporation, ‘How ACC is funded’ (available at
http://www.acc.co.nz/about-acc/WCM000119?ssSourceNodeId=4249&ss-
SourceSiteId=1494, last accessed 30 December 2007). Some other no-fault
schemes are funded by levies on medical professionals.
5 Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, s. 284.
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minent feature of the academic commentary on medical injury compen-
sation.
6 It has also been taken up by policy advisory bodies and
professional groups.
7 Taken at face value, the dispute is one about
what kind of injury compensation system should be adopted.
However, I will suggest that arguments deployed by the proponents of
no-fault systems in fact support the abandonment of injury compen-
sation altogether. Thus, I will suggest, the dispute should be re-cast as
one about whether medical injury compensation systems should exist
at all. To focus on the distinction between tort and no-fault approaches
is, I will argue, to signiﬁcantly underplay what is at stake.
Medical injury compensation is not, of course, the only locus for the
contest between tort and no-fault systems. There are, for example,
similar controversies regarding compensation for the victims of motor
vehicle injuries.
8 Moreover, injury compensation reforms often trans-
cend the boundaries between different types of injuries. For example,
the introduction of no-fault medical injury compensation in New
Zealand was merely part of a wider move to no-fault: the New
Zealand scheme has from its inception also covered the victims of work-
place, sporting, motor vehicle and other accidental injuries. It should be
6 See, for example, R.R. Bovbjerg, F.A. Sloan and P.J. Rankin, ‘Administrative
Performance of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical Injury’ (1997) 60 Law
and Contemporary Problems 71; D.M. Studdert, E.J. Thomas, B.I.W. Zbar,
J.P. Newhouse, P.C. Weiler, J. Bayuk et al., ‘Can the United States Afford a
“No-Fault” System of Compensation for Medical Injury’ (1997) 60 Law
and Contemporary Problems 1; W.J. Gaine, ‘No-fault Compensation
Systems’ (2003) 326 British Medical Journal 997.
7 See, for example, J.R.S. Pritchard, Liability and Compensation in Health
Care: A Report to the Conference of Deputy Ministers of the Federal/Provin-
cial/ Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care
(University of Toronto Press 1990); British Medical Association, Report of the
Working Party on No Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries (British
Medical Association 1991); Department of Health, Making Amends: A Con-
sultation Paper Setting Out Proposals for Reforming the Approach to Clinical
Negligence in the NHS: A Report by the Chief Medical Ofﬁcer (Department
of Health 2003) (available at http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Consultations/Closed-
consultations/DH_4072363, last accessed 30 December 2007); Department of
Health, Clinical Negligence: What Are the Issues and Options for Reform
(Department of Health 2001); Committee on Banking and Insurance, Flori-
da’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law (Report No. 2006-102) (The Florida
Senate 2005).
8 See, for example, Insurance Research Council, Compensation for Automobile
Injuries in the United States (Insurance Research Council 1989); R.A. Devlin,
‘Some Welfare Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An
Analysis of the Experience in Quebec’ in G. Dionne (ed.), Contributions to
Insurance Economics (Kluwer 1992); J.D. Cummins, R.D. Phillips and
M.A. Weiss, ‘The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance’
(2001) 44 Journal of Law and Economics 427.
32 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]unsurprising, then, that many authors have tried to assess the merits of
tort law and no-fault as general approaches to injury compensation.
9
In this paper, I will not draw any conclusions about this wider debate
between tort and no-fault approaches to compensation. I will argue only
for a reformulation of the debate about medical injury compensation.
However, I limit the argument in this way solely for pragmatic reasons.
First, since there is likely to be considerable resistance to any attempt to
re-structure the tort v. no-fault debate, it seems sensible to argue for a
reformulation of part of the debate as a ﬁrst step. Second, my argument
relies on certain parallels between the situation of those injured by
others and those suffering illnesses or other incapacities that were
purely natural in cause. These parallels will be particularly obvious to
those working in the medical sphere: both the injured and the naturally
incapacitated frequently present to similar medical establishments,
suffering from similar symptoms and requiring similar treatment.
Finally, before proceeding to my argument, a disclaimer. My back-
ground is in medicine and moral philosophy, not the law, so this is necess-
arily a somewhat amateurish contribution to what has been a heavily legal
debate. The perspective of the paper is also, perhaps, one that will seem
unfamiliar to some legal thinkers: it is unashamedly an attempt to
explore and where possible defend my intuitive judgment that both
tort-based and no-fault medical injury compensation schemes treat the
victims of natural misfortune unfairly. In my anecdotal experience, this
intuition is somewhat more difﬁcult to elicit among legally trained
people than among either moral and political philosophers or medical
practitioners. Nevertheless, I think the intuition and the conceptions of
fairness on which it can be grounded are sufﬁciently widely endorsed
that their implications for injury compensation policy are worth exploring.
II. FAIRNESS AND NO-FAULT
As noted above, my focus in this article will be on medical injury com-
pensation. However, my argument takes its start from a classic general
critique of tort law presented by the Woodhouse Commission—the
architect of New Zealand’s no-fault scheme.
10 The Commission
9 J.L. Coleman, ‘Justice and the Argument for No-Fault’ (1974) 3 Social
Theory and Practice 161; Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compen-
sation for Personal Injury (Chairman: Lord Pearson), Report of the Royal
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury
(Cmnd. 7054-1 1978); Credit Suisse First Boston, Accident Compensation:
Options for Reform, a report prepared for the New Zealand Business Round-
table (New Zealand Business Roundtable 1998).
10 The full title of the Commission was ‘The Royal Commission to Inquire into
and Report upon Workers’ Compensation’, however it is normally called
after its chairman, the Honourable Justice Owen Woodhouse.
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noted, for example, that though tort systems were committed to the
fault criterion, they failed to impose the costs of injury compensation
on those at fault, both because of the widespread (and in some cases
compulsory) uptake of liability insurance by those who were likely to
cause injuries,
11 and because the legal tests for negligence were poor
proxies for actual moral fault.
12 Moreover, though the fault criterion
was often defended on the ground that it created a disincentive to
careless action, there was little evidence to support the claim that tort
systems reduced the frequency of injuries.
13 Finally, any supposed
advantages of the tort approach came at a considerable cost: the court-
based process was expensive to administer,
14 the long and arduous
process of pressing a case may have impaired the rehabilitation of
injured claimants,
15 and the susceptibility of the procedure to chance
meant that it was difﬁcult to predict the outcome of a particular claim.
16
In addition to these predominantly pragmatic objections to tort law,
the Commission was also concerned about the justice or fairness of
the fault criterion. It was worried about the way in which the criterion
made the provision of compensation dependent on the cause of an
injury, and not on its effects:
17
Few would attempt to argue that injured workers should be treated
by society in different ways depending on the cause of the injury.
Unless economic reasons demanded it the protection and remedy
society might have to offer could not in justice be concentrated
upon a single type of accident to the exclusion of others.
In the absence of such economic reasons, the Commission complained
‘[i]t cannot be regarded as just that workmen sustaining equal losses
should be treated unequally by society’.
18 And in its strongly worded
recommendations for reform, it thus recommended an expanded
system in which the victims of all injuries would be included within
the bounds of the injury compensation scheme: ‘wisdom, logic, and
11 Royal Commission to Inquire into and Report upon Workers’ Compensation,
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal
Commission of Inquiry (1967) (hereafter, ‘The Woodhouse Report’) at
paras 82, 88.
12 Ibid., paras 82, 84–85, 87–88.
13 Ibid., para 91. See also para 90.
14 Ibid., paras 111–112. See also Bovbjerg, Sloan and Rankin, op. cit., n. 6, 71.
15 The Woodhouse Report, paras 82, 106–110, 124–125. See also Bovbjerg,
Sloan and Rankin, op. cit., n. 6, 90–93.
16 The Woodhouse Report, paras 82, 92–102.
17 The Woodhouse Report, para 6. See also, forexample, J.G. Fleming, ‘Is There
a Future for Tort?’ (1984) 44 Louisiana Law Review 1193, 1203–1204.
18 The Woodhouse Report, para 57. See also paras 6, 17, 42–46, 55, 84–86.
34 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]justice all require that every citizen who is injured must be included, and
equal losses must be given equal treatment’.
19
The thought I want to pursue is one that I take to be implicit in the
Commission’s comments: that it is unfair to deny injured persons com-
pensation purely on the grounds that their injuries were not the fault of
other persons. The force of this claim as applied to medical injury can be
brought out by recalling the cases of Smith and Jones. Smith and
Jones suffer similar medical conditions, undergo similar operations
and end up with similar complications. If Smith is awarded a large
sum of compensation that is denied to Jones, we could imagine Jones
asking why she is treated less favourably. And the only answer we
could give her is that her injury, unlike Smith’s, was not caused
negligently. But of course, this answer might well strike her as
completely unsatisfactory: that her injury did not result from negligence
was hardly within her control, so it might seem unfair that she is
disadvantaged as a result.
It is difﬁcult to remain unmoved by this complaint. There is a power-
ful and widely shared conception of fairness according to which any
relative disadvantage (or at least any important and state-mandated
relative disadvantage) is unfair if it was not within the control of its
victim.
20 And Jones’ disadvantage (relative to Smith) was clearly not
within her control.
III. EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT FROM FAIRNESS
Applied to the case of medical injury, the fairness-based argument for
no-fault runs as follows: to compensate the victims of wrongfully
caused medical injuries (as in the case of Smith) while excluding the
victims of faultlessly caused medical injuries (as in the case of Jones)
is unfair to the latter. Therefore, if we compensate wrongfully injured
patients, we should also compensate the victims of faultlessly caused
medical injuries. Assuming that we should indeed compensate the
19 Ibid., para 4.
20 This conception of fairness, or something very close to it, is adopted by many
protagonists in the debate on moral luck. See, for example, D. Enoch, ‘Luck
Between Morality, Law, and Justice’ (2007) 9 Theoretical Inquiries in Law,
Article 2; Robert Kane, ‘Review: Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free
Will: Reﬂections on Wallace’s Theory’ (2002) 64 Philosophy and Phenomen-
ological Research 693, 694, 697; D. Statman, ‘Introduction’ in D. Statman
(ed.), Moral Luck (State University of New York Press 1993) at 2–3. Luck
egalitarians develop this conception of fairness into a comprehensive
theory of distributive justice. See, for example, R.J. Arneson, ‘Equality and
Equal Opportunity for Welfare’ (1989) 56 Philosophical Studies 77; G.A.
Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’ (1989) 99 Ethics 906, or,
for a predecessor to these theories, H. Spiegelberg, ‘A Defense of Human
Equality’ (1944) 53 Philosophical Review 101.
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schemes do.
Note, however, that even no-fault schemes exclude from compen-
sation the victims of injuries or illnesses that were purely natural in
cause, and it seems possible to argue that this exclusion is also
unfair.
21 Consider the following case:
Case 3. Williams, like Smith and Jones, suffers a brain haemorrhage
as a result of a genetic defect. He too is rushed to hospital.
However, his haemorrhage is particularly severe, and before he
can be taken to the operating theatre, the part of his brain which
controls his right leg is irreversibly damaged. Thus, like Smith
and Jones, he is left with a paralysed leg, though in his case,
the paralysis is a result of the genetic condition (and subsequent
haemorrhage), not of its treatment.
We can re-apply the fairness-based argument to show that, if we are to
award compensation to Smith and/or Jones, then we should also award
compensation to Williams. Like Smith and Jones, Williams has suffered
a brain haemorrhage, and, also like the other two, he has been left with
a paralysed leg. Admittedly, Williams’ incapacity was not caused by a
surgeon (negligent or otherwise), but this fact was hardly within his
control.
The suggestion that Williams should be compensated might seem
strange, it is natural, at least in legal contexts, to think that compen-
sation is necessarily a response to some harm previously inﬂicted by
the compensator. I will, however, understand compensation more
broadly so as to include any attempt to restore a person to some
better situation that she previously enjoyed, or that she is imagined to
have enjoyed prior to the natural and social lottery of birth. (Those
who ﬁnd this deﬁnition implausible may simply read ‘compensation-like
beneﬁt’ whenever I use the word compensation.) On this understanding,
we can quite sensibly ask whether the victims of natural misfortune
ought to be compensated. And it is my contention that, if we are pre-
pared to invoke the argument from fairness in support of no-fault
medical injury compensation, then we should also invoke it in support
of compensating those incapacitated through natural misfortune.
Indeed, it seems possible that the argument from fairness could be
used to defend the compensation of all persons suffering disadvantages
that were not within their own control, regardless of whether those dis-
advantages take the form of physical incapacity (as opposed to social
disadvantages such as unemployment), and regardless of whether they
21 I henceforth use ‘incapacity’ as an umbrella term for injury and illness.
36 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]were congenital oracquired. On this view, onlyself-inﬂicted incapacities
and disadvantages—or those that could have been avoided by their
victims—would be excluded.
22 However, in what follows, I will focus
on the case of those incapacitated after birth through natural misfor-
tune, for example, due to the manifestation of a genetic disease.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, nothing I have said is new: others have pointed out the
apparent unfairness of excluding those incapacitated through natural
misfortune from no-fault medical injury compensation schemes, and
from no-fault injury compensation schemes more generally.
23 Indeed,
some have been moved, partly by this concern, to advocate the reform
of no-fault schemes.
24
However, the precise connections between fairness-based concerns
and the various policy proposals that they have motivated remain
relatively unexplored. Most authors either focus on the unfairness of
existing no-fault schemes, making only brief and speculative reform
proposals, or recommend detailed reforms but without basing these
on a clear argument from fairness-based premises. Perhaps for this
reason, there is considerable disagreement about what policies con-
siderations of fairness support.
It seems worthwhile, then, to consider where the fairness-based
argument really does lead. What are its implications for medical
injury compensation policy?
The unfairness generated by no-fault schemes arises from the fact that
those schemes treat the victims of natural misfortune less favourably
than the victims of comparable medical injuries. There are obviously
22 I assume here that self-inﬂicted injuries are within the control of their
victims—in fact, some may not be.
23 See M.A. Franklin, ‘Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and
Selective Reimbursement’ (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 774; Cane, op.
cit., n. 1, 418–422; C.H. Schroeder, ‘Causation, Compensation and Moral
Responsibility’ in D. Owen (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law
(Oxford University Press 1995) at 347, esp. at 350, 355; J. Harris, ‘The Injus-
tice of Compensation for Victims of Medical Accidents’ (1997) 314 British
Medical Journal 1821; R. Avraham and I. Kohler-Hausmann, ‘Accident
Law for Egalitarians’ (2006) 12 Legal Theory 181, esp. at 204–213.
24 A.L. Miller, ‘Should Social Insurance Pay Compensation for Pain and
Suffering?’ (1982) 31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 550;
Law Commission (New Zealand), Personal Injury: Prevention and
Recovery—Report on the Accident Compensation Scheme (Report No. 4,
Law Commission, 1988); Royal Commission on Social Policy (New
Zealand), Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy: Future Direc-
tions (1988), 757; Palmer, op. cit., n. 2, 234; Harris, op. cit. n. 22;
A. Merry and A. McCall Smith, Errors, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge
University Press 2001) at 210–211.
Med.L.Rev. Medical Injury Compensation 37two ways of resolving this unfairness: compensate the victims of natural
misfortune or deny compensation to the medically injured. But as we
have seen, those who invoke the fairness-based argument for no-fault
assume that at least some victims of medical injuries ought to be
compensated. Suppose that this assumption is correct. It would follow
that the right response to the unfairness of no-fault medical injury
schemes is to expand those schemes, not to disband them.
This is the response favoured by many who take fairness to be an
important consideration in determining compensation policy.
25 The
Woodhouse Commission itself appears to have been attracted by this
option,
26 and there have been some tentative political moves towards
expansion of the New Zealand scheme.
27
It is evident, however, that some major difﬁculties would surround
any attempt to include the naturally incapacitated within compensation
schemes. Perhaps the most obvious problem is that of cost. A scheme
which compensated more people would ceteris paribus require greater
funding, and the cost difference is likely to be substantial since the
number of people incapacitated through natural misfortune dwarfs the
number of people currently covered by even the most extensive
no-fault medical injury compensation schemes.
Given the cost implications, it seems clear that, to be economically
and politically feasible, an expanded compensation system of the sort
being considered here would have to offset the increase in coverage
with a signiﬁcant decrease in the generosity of compensation beneﬁts.
There would be no question of attempting to restore all eligible loss
victims to their pre-loss situation, as tort law systems do. Even existing
no-fault schemes have had to compromise on this objective: they typi-
cally offer less generous beneﬁts than those provided under tort law.
28
25 See, for example, Law Commission, op. cit. n. 23; K.S. Abraham and
L. Liebman, ‘Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform:
Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury’ (1993) 93
Columbia Law Review 75, esp. at 107ff.
26 The Woodhouse Commission appears to have excluded victims out of
caution (or perhaps, strategy) rather than principle. It hoped that the bound-
aries of the New Zealand scheme would be expanded to include natural inca-
pacity at a later date: See The Woodhouse Report, para 290(a): ‘It is possible
to argue that if incapacity arising from accident injury is to be the subject of
comprehensive community insurance, then interruption of work for reasons
of sickness or unemployment, or other causes which cannot be guarded
against should equally be included’. See also para 290(b) and Todd, op.
cit., n. 2, 493. An Australian Committee, also chaired by Justice Woodhouse,
did recommend the introduction of a no-fault scheme including both injury
and illness. See, The National Committee of Inquiry on Compensation and
Rehabilitation in Australia, Report (1974), vol. 1, paras 39, 226, 347.
27 See, for example, Todd, op. cit., n. 3, 414, 493; New Zealand Labour Party,
Policy Statement: Labour on ACC (1999).
28 See, for example, Todd, op. cit., n. 2, 416–418, 425.
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in common with the beneﬁts provided by social security and public
healthcare systems. These beneﬁts are sometimes linked to the previous
situation of the recipient, but, at least in the Anglophone jurisdictions,
they could not rightly be characterised as attempts to restore any
actual or hypothetical status quo ante, and they therefore do not
qualify as compensation payments at all. The coverage of an expanded
system would also be similar to that of existing social securityand public
healthcare systems, or at least, the parts of those systems which respond
to incapacity: both would cover a wide range of injuries and illnesses.
29
Thus, a scheme supported by the argument from fairness would, I think,
be more aptly described as a supplementary social security and public
healthcare system than as an injury compensation scheme.
Moreover, since both the nature and coverage of the beneﬁts provided by
the expanded no-fault ‘compensation’ scheme would compare with those
provided by existing social security and public healthcare systems, there
would be little justiﬁcation for maintaining it as a distinct scheme. There
might be a case for funding medical injury beneﬁts from a different
source than other forms of state assistance.
30 However, a difference in
funding arrangements would hardly justify the maintenance of a distinct
medical injury compensation scheme. Indeed, there would remain a
strong positive case for merging an expanded ‘compensation’ scheme into
existing social security and public healthcare systems, where these exist:
doing so would save on administrative costs. Perhaps the money saved
could be used either to augment the beneﬁts provided by social security
and public healthcare systems, or to reduce taxpayer contributions.
At ﬁrst sight, then, it appears that where the fairness-based argument
really leads is not, as sometimes thought, to a dramatically expanded
version of existing no-fault medical injury compensation schemes, but
to the abandonment of medical injury compensation altogether, with
the possible diversion of the funds saved to social security and public
healthcare systems. If this is right, the debate about what sort of
injury compensation scheme to adopt should be re-cast as a debate
about whether to retain any medical injury compensation scheme.
31
29 One difference in coverage might be that an expanded compensation scheme,
justiﬁed by the fairness-based argument, would presumably exclude the
victims of self-caused or avoidable incapacity, whereas social security and
public healthcare systems typically include such persons. See supra n. 20.
30 One possibility is that injurers could be required to bear the costs of beneﬁts
provided to their victims, even if considerations of fairness would require that
those beneﬁts be no more generous than those available to the naturally inca-
pacitated. For a similar proposal, see Harris, op. cit. n. 22.
31 Stephen Sugarman and Terrence Ison have defended similar conclusions in
the context of the wider debate between no-fault and tort law, though not
explicitly on fairness-related grounds. See S.D. Sugarman, ‘Doing Away
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The defender of no-fault medical injury compensation might, of course,
try to resist my claim that her fairness-based arguments commit her to
the abandonment of injury compensation. She might note that a line
demarking the limits of compensation cover has to be drawn some-
where, and claim that existing no-fault schemes draw it in as good a
place as any.
32 This response would perhaps be plausible if there were
no positive reason to draw the line at any particular location, but
according to the fairness argument, there is such a reason: we should
draw the line so as to include all whose situation is relevantly similar
to those already covered. As we have seen, this would entail including
those incapacitated through natural misfortune, as well, perhaps, as
those disadvantaged in any other way that was not within their control.
At this point, an advocate of no-fault compensation might turn to a
pragmatic political argument, claiming that, despite being difﬁcult to
justify, the existing boundaries of no-fault schemes are at least widely
accepted in countries that operate such schemes. However, this claim
would be at odds with the evidence: in both New Zealand and
Sweden—arguably the countries with the most stable and popular
no-fault systems—deﬁning the boundaries of medical injury compen-
sation has been a persistent problem.
33
Perhaps a more promising line of response would see the proponent
of no-fault medical injury compensation distancing herself from the
fairness-based argument altogether and defending her preferred system
on independent grounds. In the remainder of this section, I will consider
various alternative arguments for no-fault; perhaps it will be possible to
ﬁnd some argument that does not telescope into an argument for the
abandonment of medical injury compensation altogether.
As it happens, however, some of the leading alternative arguments for
preferring no-fault compensation to tort law are also quite consistent
with the abandonment of medical injury compensation. Consider, for
example, an argument presented by Jeremy Waldron in his oft-cited
‘Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss’.
34 Waldron notes that,
with Tort Law’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 555; T. Ison, The Forensic
Lottery (Staples Press 1967), esp. at chapter 4.
32 See Todd, op. cit., n. 2, 495: ‘[t]he boundaries to the [New Zealand] accident
compensation scheme as they presently exist may be hard to defend, but there
is no natural limit upon which all can agree. A line has to be drawn some-
where, and wherever it is it will create difﬁculties and anomalies in relation
to cases that are excluded’. See also Cane, op. cit., n. 1, 334–336.
33 See Todd, op. cit., n. 2, 412–414, 493–495; Studdert, Thomas, Zbar, New-
house, Weiler, Bayuk et al., op. cit., n. 6, 10–13; Oliphant, op. cit.,n .3 .
34 J. Waldron, ‘Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss’ in D.G. Owen (ed.),
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press 1995). See
40 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]since tort systems link compensatory damages to the severity of the
injury that has been caused (rather than the culpability of the injurer’s
conduct), they may impose on injurers much greater compensation
burdens than they deserve to bear. This point might, he tentatively
suggests, be adduced in support of shifting to a no-fault approach.
35
However, though the problem of excessive penalties could be avoided
by moving to a no-fault system, it could also be avoided by doing
away with compensation altogether. No-fault schemes avoid imposing
excessive penalties by severing the tight connection between penalties
for injurers and compensation payments for the injured. But replacing
injury compensation schemes with (perhaps augmented) social security
and public healthcare systems would also sever this link.
Consider alternatively the pragmatic arguments for no-fault cited
by the Woodhouse Commission and others: tort systems face high
administrative costs, have uncertain outcomes, may involve prolonged
and arduous court proceedings, etc. There are different ways in which
we might interpret these arguments. On one view, they are being
invoked to support the claim that tort systems actually do more harm
than good—their negative effects outweigh any positive ones. If true,
this would certainly provide grounds for disbanding tort systems, but
it would not justify their replacement with no-fault schemes. We
could just as well avoid the harms inﬂicted by tort law systems by
doing away with injury compensation altogether.
There is, however, an alternative way of understanding the Commis-
sion’s pragmatic arguments, and one that may be friendlier to the
defender of no-fault medical injury compensation. On this second
interpretation, the suggestion is simply that tort systems are rather inef-
ﬁcient means of achieving their own goals, and that no-fault schemes
might, paradoxically, be better than tort systems at achieving the
goals of tort law.
Whether this claim is correct will depend on what we take the goals of
tort law to be. Here, commentators are divided. On one popular view, the
aim of tort law is to enforce the special obligations that (wrongful)
injurers have towards their victims.
36 On this view, it is difﬁcult to see
also The Woodhouse Report, para 85: ‘it is acurious fact that ...the extent of
liability is not measured by the quality of the defendant’s conduct, but by its
results. Reprehensible conduct can be followed by feather blows while a
moment’s inadvertence could call down the heavens’.
35 See Waldron, op. cit., n. 34, 407–408.
36 See, for example, G.C. Keating, ‘Distributive and Corrective Justice in the
Tort Law of Accidents’ (2000) 74 Southern California Law Review 193,
193–194. Keating claims that ‘ordinary morality links responsibility for
harm done with the duty to repair that harm’ (at 193) and that the justice-
based justiﬁcations for tort law ‘acknowledge a prima facie link between
responsibility for having inﬂicted injury and responsibility for repairing the
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ends of tort law, since no-fault systems remove any direct connection
between the penalties borne by injurers and the payments made to their
victims. The victims of wrongful medical injuries will be compensated
under no-fault schemes, but that compensation will come not from the
injurer but from a fund sustained by the general population, or, in
some cases, the whole medical profession. Similarly, though wrongful
injurers may, under no-fault systems, be required to bear some kind of
penalty (such as a criminal or professional disciplinary sanction), this
will not normally take the formof a payment made tothe injurer’s victim.
On an alternative view, medical injury compensation systems (includ-
ing tort law) should be regarded as having two quite separate functions:
one being fulﬁlled by the penalisation of wrongful injurers—the
function here is normally thought to be the prevention of medical
injury—and the other being to provide compensation to the victims
of wrongful injuries. Call this the ‘two-function’ view.
37 If we accept
this view, then it is, I think, plausible that no-fault schemes are more
efﬁcient means to the ends of tort law than is tort law itself.
Consider, to begin with, the function of medical injury prevention.
Tort systems are often defended on the grounds that they deter people
from injuring one another.
38 Clearly, though, the imposition of
compensatory damages is not the only way of deterring or preventing
medical injury. Other legal penalties—such as criminal or professional
sanctions—may also play a deterrent role, as may moral blame. Injury
may also be prevented by policies that have nothing to do with deterrence,
but instead institute educational or institutional reforms designed to
remove social and psychological causes of injury (limits on doctors’
injury inﬂicted’ (at 193–194). The special relationship between the injurer
and his victim is also emphasised, and adduced in support of tort law, in
J.J. Thomson, ‘Remarks on Causation and Liability’ (1984) 13 Philosophy
and Public Affairs 101; T. Honore ´, ‘Responsibility and Luck: The Moral
Basis of Strict Liability’ (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 530; E.J. Weinrib, ‘Understanding
Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, esp. at 512;
J. Coleman, ‘The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa
Law Review 427, esp. at 433–438; S.R. Perry, ‘The Moral Foundations of
Tort Law’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 449, esp. at 497ff.; J.L. Coleman,
Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press 1992) at 354; E.J. Weinrib,
The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press 1995), esp. at 75–76,
80–83, 114–144; A. Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (Cam-
bridge University Press 1999), esp. at 56–57, 65, 80–84.
37 For the two-function view, see Palmer, op. cit., n. 2, 254–255; Avraham and
Kohler-Hausmann, op. cit., n. 22; M.A. Franklin, ‘Replacing the Negligence
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement’ (1967) 53 Virginia
Law Review 774, 795.
38 Some would argue that deterrence is the raison d’e ˆtre of tort law. See, for
example, R.A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Negligence’ (1972) 1 Journal of Legal
Studies 29.
42 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]working hours, hospital safety campaigns, etc.).
39 It has even been
argued that moving away from tort law could in fact aid medical injury
prevention by, for example, reducing excessively defensive medical
practice
40 and allowing easier collection of data on the institutional and
psychological causes of injury.
41 It is thus unclear, from a theoretical
point of view, whether we should expect tort systems to facilitate
medical injury prevention more effectively than their no-fault counter-
parts. The empirical evidence is also unclear.
42 However, there is little
evidence that tort systems are associated with lower medical injury rates
than no-fault regimes.
43 It thus seems that tort systems may lack any sig-
niﬁcant deterrent effect, or that any deterrent effect that they do have may
be offset by other injury-promoting effects which no-fault systems lack.
On the compensation provision side, there are also reasons to think
that no-fault schemes do better than their tort law counterparts.
No-fault systems typically have much lower administrative costs than
tort systems, and they thus allow more compensation to be paid for
the same overall cost.
44 Of course, that compensation is also spread
over a larger group of people, so if the compensatory aim of tort law
is solely to compensate the victims of wrongful medical injuries, then
it is not clear that no-fault schemes satisfy this aim better than tort
39 Gaine, op. cit., n. 6, 998.
40 See G.T. Schwarz, ‘Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?’ (1994) 42 UCLA Law Review 377, 401–403; Cane, op.
cit., n. 1, 366–367; Merry and McCall Smith, op. cit., n. 23, 215–216.
41 See Gaine, op. cit., n. 6; B.A. Liang, ‘Error in Medicine: Legal Impedimentsto
US Reform’ (1999) 24 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 27, esp. at
33–35, 39–44; J. Fitzjohn and D.M. Studdert, ‘A Compensation Perspective
on Error Prevention: Is the ACC Medical Misadventure Scheme Compensating
the Right Sort of Injury?’ (2001) 114 New Zealand Medical Journal 432.
42 See D. Dewees and M. Trebilcock, ‘The Efﬁcacy of the Tort System and its
Alternatives: A Review of the Empirical Evidence’ (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 58; Schwarz, op. cit., n. 40; Merry and McCall Smith, op.
cit., n. 23, 213–214; M.M. Mello and T.A. Brennan, ‘Deterrence of
Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform’ (2002) 80
Texas Law Review 1595.
43 See C. Brown, ‘Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experi-
ence’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 976, esp. at 984–1002; Mello and
Brennan, op. cit., n. 42; Gaine, op. cit., n. 6, 998; F.A. Sloan, S.S. Entman,
B.A. Reilly, C.A. Glass, G.B. Hickson, H.H. Zhang et al., ‘Tort
Liability and Obstetricians’ Care Levels’ (1997) 17 International Review of
Law & Economics 245–260. Compare R.A. Devlin, ‘Some Welfare Impli-
cations of No-Fault Automobile Insurance’ (1990) 10 International Review
of Law and Economics 193; F.A. Sloan, B.A. Reilly and C.M. Schenzler,
‘Tort Liability versus Other Approaches for Deterring Careless Driving’
(1994) 14 International Review of Law and Economics 53.
44 See P.C. Weiler, H.H. Hiatt, J.P. Newhouse, W.G. Johnson, T.A. Brennan,
L.L. Leape et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice
Litigation, and Patient Compensation (Harvard University Press 1993)
at 106.
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of compensation, but much of that compensation will go to persons who
were not the victims of wrongful injuries.
45 Counterbalancing this,
however, is the fact that, under tort systems, only a small minority of
those eligible for medical injury compensation actually ﬁle a claim for
damages.
46 No-fault schemes present lower barriers to potential clai-
mants and may therefore compensate more of those who would have
been eligible for compensation at tort law than do tort systems.
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that by adopting the two-
function view, one can persuasively argue that no-fault medical injury
compensation systems better achieve the aims of tort law than do tort
systems. We should also grant that this argument does not telescope
into an argument for further expanding the boundaries of compen-
sation, and ultimately abandoning medical injury compensation
altogether, for according to this argument, the compensatory goal of
both tort law and no-fault schemes is to compensate the victims of
wrongful medical injuries. No-fault schemes obviously compensate
many other persons besides, but they do this only because this is the
most efﬁcient way of ensuring that compensation gets to those for
whom it is intended: the wrongfully injured. There is, on this view, no
need to assume that the victims of faultlessly caused medical injuries
actually have any direct moral claim to compensation, and there is
thus no pressure to further extend the boundaries of compensation so
as to include the victims of natural misfortune.
Notice, however, that though the argument under consideration does
not itself extend into an argument for the abandonment of medical
injury compensation, anyone who advances it does leave himself open
to fairness-based objections. Someone concerned that incapacitated
persons not be treated unfavourably based on factors beyond their
45 Studdert and collaborators conservatively estimate that even a highly restric-
tive no-fault system (of the sort existing in Sweden) would pay compensation
to at least two to three times as many people as existing tort law schemes. See
Studdert, Thomas, Zbar, Newhouse, Weiler, Bayuk et al., op. cit., n. 6, 32.
46 Results from a large retrospective study conducted in Utah and Colorado
during the 1990s indicated that only 2.5% of patients eligible for compensa-
tory damages in those states ﬁled claims at tort law. This ﬁgure increased to
3.8% when patients whose injuries caused no signiﬁcant or serious disability
were excluded. See D.M. Studdert, E.J. Thomas, H.R. Burstin, B.I.W. Zbar,
E.J. Orav and T.A. Brennan, ‘Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming
Behavior in Utah and Colorado’ (2000) 38 Medical Care 250. Results from
an earlier study in New York State indicated that at most 13% of those eli-
gible for compensation in that state ﬁled suits. See A.R. Localio, A.G. Law-
thers, T.A. Brennan, N.M. Laird, L.E. Hebert, L.M. Peterson et al.,
‘Relation between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negli-
gence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III’ (1991) 325 New
England Journal of Medicine 245.
44 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]control might ask why the aim of compensation systems should be to
compensate only the victims of wrongful injuries, rather than the
victims of all medical injuries and all other comparable kinds of misfor-
tune. It is not clear how anyone who accepts the two-function view can
respond. If compensation systems had a single aim—to enforce the
special obligations of wrongful injurers to their victims—then there
would be an obvious ground for excluding from compensation the
victims of natural misfortune: since no one caused that misfortune, no
one has a special obligation to fund its compensation. But once one
accepts the two-function view, this line of response is blocked. On
that view, the justiﬁcation for providing compensation payments is
distinct from the justiﬁcation for imposing compensatory damages on
wrongful injurers. Presumably, then, the justiﬁcation for providing
compensation is to be found not in the wrongdoing of the injurer, but
in the situation of the injured: perhaps compensation serves to satisfy
unmet need, to alleviate undeserved suffering or to restore equality.
But these justiﬁcations for compensation apply as much to the victims
of natural incapacity as to those wrongfully injured by others. Limiting
compensation to the latter thus seems arbitrary.
What the proponent of the no-fault approach requires is an argument
that does not extend into an argument for the abandonment of medical
injury compensation, and that is also able to block any independent
fairness-based argument for abandoning it. I am aware of one argument
which may satisfy these conditions.
Recall that proponents of tort law sometimes attempt to justify their
preferred system of medical injury compensation by appealing to the
view that (wrongful) injurers have special obligations towards their
victims. As we have seen, no-fault systems cannot be justiﬁed by
appeal to this view. Since no-fault systems sever the connection between
the compensation payments made by injurers and the payments received
by injury victims, they fail to enforce the special obligations that injurers
allegedly have. Proponents of no-fault compensation may, however, be
able to appeal to an amended version of the special obligations view:
they might claim that it is not only individual (wrongful) injurers who
have obligations to their victims, societies also have special obligations
towards those injured through practices adopted by those societies. Argu-
ably, no-fault medical injury compensation schemes do enforce these
special societal obligations, since they effectively require society-at-large
to bear the costs of compensating persons who have been injured
through a social practice: that is, medicine.
47 Moreover, if the argument
47 See Cane, op. cit., n. 1, 333–334; Todd, op. cit., n. 2, 493–495; Merry and
McCall Smith, op. cit., n. 23, 209–211.
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obligations, then no-fault schemes may justiﬁably exclude from com-
pensation the victims of natural misfortune. Their exclusion would be
justiﬁable on the grounds that society is not causally responsible for
those misfortunes, and therefore lacks any special obligation towards
their victims.
I do not think, however, that this argument from special social
obligation can provide a satisfying justiﬁcation for no-fault medical
injury compensation. The problem is this: if societies have special
obligations to compensate those injured through (sometimes) harmful
social practices, then individuals also have similar obligations towards
those harmed through their own individual conduct. It is difﬁcult to
imagine any argument for the existence of such special obligations at
the societal level that would not also apply at the individual level.
Indeed, those who defend special societal obligations often do so by
drawing parallels between societal agents and individual persons.
48 But
if individuals have special obligations to compensate those whom they
have harmed, then there is at least a prima facie justiﬁcation for tort
law. After all, tort law could be regarded as a way of enforcing those
special individual obligations. Thus, though an appeal to special societal
obligations might justify the introduction of no-fault compensation, it
also suggests a parallel justiﬁcation for tort law. The argument therefore
appearsto support not the replacement of tort systems, but their augmen-
tation with no-fault schemes. This poses a challenge to proponents of
no-fault compensation, most of whom instead advocate replacement.
Perhaps this challenge can be met. Perhaps, for example, it can be
shown that special societal obligations should be enforced, while individ-
ual ones should not. However, this is work that remains to be done.
VI. TORT LAW V. THE ABANDONMENT OF MEDICAL
INJURY COMPENSATION
It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd any way in which one can defend no-fault medical
injury compensation schemes in a way which justiﬁes excluding the
48 Thomas Pogge explicitly draws an analogy between the special obligations of
individuals and the special obligations of societies. He claims that ‘your
moral reason to mitigate the injuries of an accident victim is stronger if
you were materially involved in causing his or her accident’, then continuing
‘I assert an analogous point also in regard to any social institutions that
agents are materially involved in upholding...we should design any insti-
tutional order so that it prioritises the mitigation of medical conditions
whose incidence it substantially contributes to’. See T. Pogge, ‘Relational
Conceptions of Justice: Responsibilities for Health Outcomes’ in S. Anand,
F. Peter and A. Sen (eds), Public Health, Ethics and Equity (Clarendon
2004) at 135.
46 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]naturally incapacitated from such schemes. But, if my arguments above
are sound, the only feasible way of removing this exclusion involves
giving up on medical injury compensation, relying instead on social
security and public healthcare arrangements. It thus seems plausible
that the debate between tort law and no-fault approaches to medical
injury compensation ought to be re-formulated as a debate between
maintaining tort law or abandoning medical injury compensation
altogether.
How that debate should be settled is, of course, a further question.
Many sophisticated arguments have been developed in order to defend
tort systems. These appeal inter alia to reciprocity and fairness in risk
imposition;
49 to contractualist procedures that balance liberty and
security;
50 to economic theories of deterrence;
51 and to agency-based
conceptions of corrective justice.
52 I cannot systematically assess these
arguments here. I do, however, want to end by suggesting that the
issue between tort law and the abandonment of medical injury compen-
sation ought to be a live one; though it is at odds with current practice,
the abandonment of medical injury compensation should be considered
a serious option.
We can begin by noting that any argument for preferring tort-based
medical injury compensation to the abandonment of medical injury
compensation will have to reject the two-function view—the view that
the burdens and beneﬁts of compensation serve different functions. As
we have seen, accepting the two-function view leaves one without the
resources to respond to fairness-based arguments for expanding the
scope of compensation. The defender of tort law should, then, accept
some alternative view, and the most prominent candidate is the view
that both sides of the compensation coin—the burden for the medical
injurer and the beneﬁt for the medically injured—serve the common
goal of ensuring that wrongful injurers fulﬁl their special obligations
49 See G.P. Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’ (1972) 85 Harvard
Law Review 537; Keating, op. cit., n. 36. See also Honore ´, op. cit., n. 36,
537–543; Ripstein, op. cit., n. 36, 2, 10, 30–31, 42–93.
50 See Ripstein, op. cit., n. 36, 6–9, 55–63.
51 See Posner, op. cit., n. 38; J.P. Brown, ‘Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability’ (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 323; S. Shavell, ‘Strict Liability
versus Negligence’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 1; J.H. Arlen, ‘Reconsi-
dering Efﬁcient Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity
Accidents’ (1990) 32 William and Mary Law Review 41.
52 See Honore ´, op. cit., n. 36, esp. at 543–545; Coleman, ‘The Mixed
Conception of Corrective Justice’, op. cit., n. 36, esp. at 442–443; Perry,
op. cit., n. 36, 497ff.; Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, op. cit., n. 36,
83–144. ‘Corrective justice’ is, in these theories, understood as a realm of
justice that is distinct from distributive or retributive justice.
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this view.
53
But do medical injurers really have these special obligations to their
victims (as opposed, say, to some more general obligations to alter
their practice)? And if so, what is their nature? In what follows, I
offer one argument for the view that, if medical injurers have special
obligations to their victims, they are not the sorts of obligations that
could be enforced by tort law. I do not claim that this argument is
decisive. There may be some good objection to it, or some stronger
countervailing argument. But I hope that my argument does enough
to establish that attempts to justify the tort approach to medical
injury compensation by reference to such special obligations are not
obviously persuasive.
My argument begins by granting that, intuitively, wrongful injurers—
whether they are medical professionals or not—do have special obli-
gations to their victims. Consider the following non-medical case:
Scenario 1. Anne, an irremediably reckless cyclist, is cycling in her
usual dangerous fashion one day when she strikes a pedestrian, Ben,
knocking him to the ground. At precisely the same time, another
pedestrian in the vicinity, Claire, is struck by an unusually strong
gust of wind. She too falls to the ground. As a result of their
falls, Ben and Claire are incapacitated to an equal degree. Realizing
what has happened, Anne decides that she must assist one of them.
However, she cannot assist them both. She decides to assist Ben, the
person whose fall she caused.
In this scenario, Anne has clearly done something morally wrong: namely,
she has recklessly knocked Ben to the ground. However, I suspect many
would also say that, in helping Ben up, she has done something right,
and perhaps that this partially mitigates her previous wrongful act. But
consider now the following amended version of the scenario:
Scenario 2. All is as in Scenario 1, except this time Anne chooses to
help Claire rather than Ben.
Here again, Anne has acted wrongly in recklessly knocking Ben to the
ground. And many might also say that, in helping Claire up, Anne has
done something right. However, I think most people will want to say
that Anne’s response in Scenario 2 does less to offset her earlier
wrong than did her response in Scenario 1.
53 See, for example, Honore ´, op. cit., n. 36; Perry, op. cit., n. 36, esp. at 497ff.;
Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, op. cit., n. 36, esp. at 75–76, 80–83,
114–144; Ripstein, op. cit., n. 36, esp. at 56–57, 65, 80–84.
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and 2 would be to suppose that, over and above any obligations that
Anne has to assist both Ben and Claire, she has some additional
special obligation towards Ben. Moreover, it is natural to think of this
special obligation as an obligation that Anne has to ‘make amends
for’ or ‘put right’ the loss that she has wrongfully caused. This, of
course, is precisely the sort of obligation which tort-based systems of
medical injury compensation seem to enforce. Thus, it might seem
that the above-mentioned intuitive responses to Scenarios 1 and 2 give
some support to the view that people sometimes have special obligations
of the sort that might justify tort systems.
There is, however, an alternative explanation for the intuitive
difference between Scenarios 1 and 2. To bring out this explanation, I
want to propose a variant of Scenario 2:
Scenario 3. All is as before except that this time Anne pays so little
attention to where she is cycling that she fails to see which of Ben
and Claire she has struck. She simply feels her bicycle come to an
abrupt halt, and then notices two people lying on the road in
front of her. Realizing what must have happened, she decides she
should help whichever of the two persons she has knocked down.
She hazards a guess, and as it happens, she chooses to help
Claire, whose fall she did not cause.
What should we say about Anne’s response in this scenario? Should we,
as in Scenario 2, attribute a (minor) moral failure to Anne on the
grounds that she chose to help Claire (whose fall she did not cause)
rather than Ben? My intuition is that we should not. Rather, I think
we should say that, given her intention to help the ‘right’ person, her
response is morally on a par with her response in Scenario 1. The fact
that she chose to help the wrong person seems irrelevant to the moral
assessment of her conduct. But if the facts about whom Anne actually
ends up saving are irrelevant in Scenario 3, then surely they are also irre-
levant in Scenarios 1 and 2. It seems that we can no longer attribute a
moral failure to Anne in Scenario 2 merely because, in that case, she
chose to aid Claire (whose fall she did not cause) rather than Ben
(whose fall she wrongfully caused).
How, then, can we account for the intuition that Anne is guilty of a
greater moral failing in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1? One answer to
this question would run as follows. We generally expect that those
who wrongfully harm others should show some remorse for those
harms. Moreover, when we see evidence of such remorse, as when
someone attempts to make amends for her actions, we frequently
soften the attitude that we take towards the wrongdoer. Perhaps in Scen-
ario 1, where Anne chooses to assist Ben, we assume that she does so in
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make this assumption regarding Scenario 3, in which we are told that
Anne wishes to assist whoever she has struck. Though, as it happens,
she chooses to help the wrong person, we can retain the thought that
she was attempting to make amends for her action. In Scenario 2,
however, it is difﬁcult to sustain the assumption that Anne’s action is
motivated (in part) by her remorse. Perhaps, then, to the extent that
we morally disapprove of her decision to help Claire in that case, we
do so simply because we interpret it as evidence of a lack of remorse
on her part.
If this is the correct explanation of our intuitive judgments, then those
judgments no longer support the existence of special obligations of the
sort that tort-based systems of medical injury compensation enforce.
Perhaps medical professionals who wrongfully injure their patients
have a special obligation towards their victims—an obligation to feel
remorse—but an obligation to feel remorse is not, and need not
imply, an obligation to compensate. Admittedly, the provision of com-
pensation might communicate remorse, but it is not a necessary com-
ponent of it; one can feel remorse without providing compensation.
Moreover, an obligation to feel remorse is not the sort of obligation
that could be enforced by tort law. Being required to compensate
one’s victim—as under tort law—is quite consistent with feeling no
remorse for one’s action. Indeed, being required to pay such compen-
sation might even discourage feelings of remorse to the extent that the
injurer may feel that, having paid compensation, she has been let off
the hook as far as her obligations to her victim are concerned.
There might, of course, be some independent argument for the view
that those who wrongfully cause medical injuries have special obli-
gations to compensate their victims—some argument that does not
rely on our intuitions about cases such as Scenarios 1–3.
54 However,
I doubt that any such argument will have the initial plausibility that a
direct appeal to intuition can have. Thus, if I have succeeded in under-
mining the intuitive case for the existence of special obligations to
compensate, I think I will have done enough to call into question the
obviousness of the view that there are such obligations and that these
justify tort law. It would then be reasonable to conclude that the issue
that I have raised between tort law and the abandonment of compen-
sation should not obviously be resolved in favour of tort law: serious
consideration should be given to the prospect of abandoning injury
54 For criticism of some theoretical arguments for the existence of such special
obligations to compensate, see Avraham and Kohler-Hausmann, op. cit.,
n. 22; Schroeder, op. cit., n. 22.
50 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2009]compensation altogether, perhaps diverting the saved funds to social
security and public healthcare systems.
This might seem an unlikely result, especially to those in jurisdictions
where medical injury compensation has never seriously deviated from
the tort law paradigm. But it should be remembered that both tort
law and no-fault medical injury compensation are relatively recent
innovations—they are not permanent ﬁxtures on the institutional
landscape.
55 Moreover, since their initial introduction, some of their
functions have been taken over by developing social security and
public healthcare systems, as well as by alternative mechanisms for
preventing medical injury. I am merely suggesting that we should
consider whether to make this takeover complete.
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branch of the law until the late nineteenth century. Nor had the now-
dominant concept of negligence been delineated before that time. See, for
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